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E-Book Conspiracy: The Rule of Reason & 
Department of Justice v. Apple & Price-Fixing 
I. Introduction  
In 2010, Apple was anticipating the launch of its new “iBook” store. With that launch, 
Apple effectively entered into the e-book retail market.
1
 However, Apple entered an e-book 
market dominated by its established competitors such as Barnes &Noble and Amazon. Apple 
saw little chance of successfully competing with the pricing schemes of these competitors while 
also generating a profit in the current e-book market.
2
 As a result, “Apple demanded, as a 
precondition of its entry into the market, that it would not have to compete with Amazon on 
price.”3 
 Though Apple was not established in either the e-book publishing market or the e-reader 
manufacturing market, Apple was “one of America’s most admired, dynamic and successful 
technology companies.”4 In order to convert its general technological market share advantage 
into an e-reader and e-book market share advantage, Apple contacted the “Big Six” publishers 
about setting up a pricing scheme for its e-book store that would allow it to evade the traditional 
competition in the e-book market.
5
 The Big Six consisted of the six largest publishing firms in 
the world. It consisted of Hachette, Macmillan, Penguin, HarperCollins, Simon & Schuster, and 
Random House. Of those six publishing firms, only Random House refused to cooperate with 
Apple’s scheme to artificially inflate e-book prices.6 
 Apple and five of the Big Six publishers developed a pricing scheme called the “Agency 
Model.” Under this scheme, Apple became a nominal publishing agent. For every e-book that 
Apple sold, the publishers received 70% and Apple received 30%.
7
 The five remaining 
publishers agreed to this minimum resale price fixing, because they were afraid of Amazon’s 
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burgeoning power within the e-book industry.
8
 Amazon regularly took a loss on bestselling e-
books by purchasing them from the publishers for $11.99 and subsequently selling them for 
$9.99. At first, publishing profits soared.
9
 However, the major publishers began to resent 
Amazon when Amazon started offering an e-book publishing scheme to any and all prospective 
authors that was far more lucrative to those authors than a traditional print publishing contract.
10
 
In supporting Apple’s Agency Model, the publishers hoped to diminish Amazon’s market share 
in the e-book publishing and e-reader manufacturing market.
11
 
 Under the agreement between Apple and the major publishers, retail e-book prices were 
set between $12.99 and $15.99.
12
 Apple also had a great deal of discretion in setting these prices 
despite the notion of the Agency Model. Apple demanded and received the ability to set prices 
for most of the e-book market; forbidding the publishers who contracted with Apple from 
allowing any other e-book retailer to sell below the prices that Apple set. “Apple demanded, as a 
precondition of its entry into the market, that it would not have to compete with Amazon on 
price.”13 The publishers then had the leverage to demand that the Agency Model apply to all 
other e-book retailers without the “Most Favored Nation” clause included in their contract with 
Apple.
14
 Following the obvious and deliberate price-fixing agreement between Apple and the 
major publishers, the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Apple and the publishers.
15
 
The Department of Justice “alleges that the defendants conspired to raise, fix, and stabilize 
the retail price for newly-released and bestselling trade e-books, to end retail price competition 
among trade e-books retailers, and to limit retail price competition among the Publisher 
Defendants in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”16 The issue that arises in this 
case and the issue central to this paper is whether the price fixing employed by Apple and the 
major publishers to control the e-book market violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. As this paper 
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and all relevant case law shows, it does.
17
 Apple and its co-defendants colluded to artificially 
inflate prices in the e-book market in an attempt to undermine and diminish Amazon’s share of 
that market.
18
 As a result, the cost to consumers purchasing e-books grew, publisher profits fell, 
author earnings plummeted, and the overall retail e-book market grew more inefficient. Apple 
was the only party who benefited.
19
 
II. History of the Supreme Court’s Price Fixing Policy 
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act and Per Se Illegality  
The Sherman Antitrust Act was one of the first attempts by the legislature of the United 
States to stop corporations and other such business ventures from engaging in anti-competitive 
practices that harmed both trade and the consumers. The relevant section of the act is section 1, 
and it states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every 
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination 
or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other 
person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or 
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
20
 
As stated above, this act is generally considered to be overbroad. Over the next century, the 
Supreme Court narrowed the offending instances considerably. The first case relevant to the 




 The issue in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. was whether the Dr. 
Miles Medical Company could force its retailers to sell its medical products at or above the 
prices it established.
22
 Minimum retail price fixing was deemed per se illegal by the Supreme 
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Court in the Dr. Miles case. This type of price fixing harmed both the consumers and the 
retailers. Avoiding pricing schemes that harm the consumers was one of the main reasons the 
Sherman Antitrust Act was established.
23
 The Court ruled, in essence, that minimum resale price 
fixing was per se illegal.
24
 The Court’s ruling was that minimum retail price fixing was a policy 
that only served to raise prices unnecessarily for consumers.
25
 The Court decided that such a 
policy could not coexist with the Sherman Antitrust Act. The per se illegality of minimum retail 
price fixing established in Dr. Miles remained the law for almost a century. 
B. The Supreme Court Overrules Dr. Miles on Maximum Price Fixing in Khan. 
 In 1997, the Supreme Court extended the Rule of Reason’s power and applicability in its 
judgment of State Oil Co. v. Khan.
26
 In Khan, the antitrust issue before the Court was whether 
maximum resale price fixing fit within the framework of the Sherman Antitrust Act or whether it 
was per se illegal.
27
 For decades, the Court upheld its judgment in Dr. Miles that established a 
per se condemnation of price fixing.
28
 The Court’s decision received a great deal of criticism 
when it upheld the per se invalidation of all maximum price restraints in Albrecht.
29
 The Court’s 
decision in Albrecht, it was this reaction to its opinion in Albrecht that forced the Court to 
reassess the issue, because the Court acknowledged the “substantial criticism the 
decision…received,” and in Khan, the Court finally decided that there was “insufficient 
economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing.”30 As a result, 
the Court judged that “vertical maximum price fixing, like the majority of commercial 
arrangements subject to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the Rule of Reason.”31 
 The Court’s judgment in Khan was another step away from the Court’s original and 
universal condemnation of all trade restraints established in Dr. Miles.
32
 The Sherman Antitrust 
Act was established by Congress to protect America’s citizens and markets from predatory 
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 Congress appointed the Court the sole party able to determine what business 
practices did or did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
Over the course of the century following its Dr. Miles opinion, the Court’s opinions 
constantly altered which restraints on trade were truly injurious.
34
 The Court’s shifting 
interpretation of trade restraints was a result of constantly evolving economic theorems. As 
economists shifted the definition of practices that stimulated the economy and practices that 
harmed and depressed it, the Court altered its judgments to keep pace with the constantly shifting 
economic landscape. The Court asserted that “recognizing and adapting to changed 
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience,” within the economic realm, was part 
of its duty.
35
 The Court’s opinion in Khan was partly a reaction to the evolving economic 
markets. 
 In its Khan opinion, the Court discussed the possible procompetitive effects of maximum 
price fixing.
36
 The Court mostly referenced the economic criticisms of Albrecht.
37
 In expanding 
its interpretation of the Rule of Reason, the Court managed to remove and convert a portion of 
the Rule of Reason’s detractors. However, this expansion prompted the evolution of antitrust law 
that resulted in the Court’s eventual Leegin opinion. 
C. The Supreme Court Overrules Dr. Miles on Minimum Price Fixing in 
Leegin. 
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court overruled its Dr. Miles decision in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007). After 96 years of applying per se illegality 
to minimum resale price fixing cases, the Supreme Court decided to overrule its Dr. Miles 
decision.
38
 In its Leegin opinion, the Court established the Rule of Reason as the proper standard 
applicable to minimum resale price fixing, whether or not there was a violation of section 1 of 
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the Sherman Antitrust Act.
39
 “Under this rule, the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a 
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition.”40 The Supreme Court went on to enumerate many of the factors 
integral to the outcome of its Rule of Reason test. 
 The Court established many factors to consider within the umbrella of the Rule of Reason 
test, but it also implied that its enumerated factors were neither complete nor exhaustive. One of 
the factors it considered was “specific information about the relevant business and the restraint’s 
history, nature, and effect.”41 The Court’s opinion involved examining the relative industry, how 
the restraint arose, why the restraint arose, what it was supposed to accomplish, and what it 
actually achieved. Another aspect of the Rule of Reason the Court enumerated was “whether the 
businesses involved have market power.”42 Corporations, ventures, and trusts would be more 
likely to violate the Rule of Reason if those price fixing entities had the necessary power and 
influence to harm competing entities in the relevant market or to harm the customers of those 
other businesses and concerns while exerting a monopolistic-type power. 
 Further, the Rule of Reason analyzed the relationship between market power, market 
structure, and the free trade restraint’s actual effect on the market.43 This is similar to the aspects 
of the Rule of Reason enumerated above, but it looked less at the initial motivation and more at 
the effects of the initiated restraint on free trade had on the overall market. An attempt to suborn 
a certain market, having a sinister motive that barely affected the market and free trade, was less 
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 With its implementation of the Rule of Reason, the Court essentially backed away from a 
per se condemnation of minimum resale price fixing. It argued that some of these price fixing 
restraints could have stimulating effects on a market and could serve to benefit consumers and 
therefore the general public.
45
 The Court wanted to limit its condemnation to those restraints that 
had already negatively and actually affected a certain market; or at least those that were almost 
certainly going to produce a negative effect in the future. Further, the Court chose to proscribe 
anticompetitive practices that harmed the consuming public more harshly than it proscribed those 
that harmed business interests.
46
 The Supreme Court focused on three main criteria in its 
application of the Rule of Reason. 
In each of its analyses, the Court first focused on the intent of the trade-restraining party 
and whether a conspiracy of collusion existed. Next, the Court looked at the harm caused by the 
suspect to the relevant market or industry. Lastly, the Court determined whether or not the 
relevant and alleged restraint actually caused harm to the consumer. Of these three aspects, the 
Supreme Court found restraints that harmed the consuming public to be the most insidious. After 
all, the Sherman Antitrust Act’s main goal was the “protection of competition, not 
competitors.”47  
III. Evolution of the Supreme Court’s Application of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act to Trade Restraints. 
A. Per Se Illegality Applied to All Restraints 
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted by Congress in 1890. The act banned “every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”48 For the first few years of the act’s existence, the Court interpreted the statute 
literally. The Court invalidated “every contract…in restraint of trade.”49 The Court did not care if 
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the restraint was harmful or even helpful to the market. Many legal scholars argued for a more 
discerning test to apply to market restraints.
50
 From the Sherman Act’s conception, dissenting 
justices of the Court wrote opinions arguing for a legal standard that only condemned a 
defendant if the “restraint which it produces be unreasonable.”51 
 The Court first limited the overly broad scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act in Standard 
Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States.
52
 The Court decided this case in 1911, and this was the first time 
the Court’s application of the Sherman Antitrust Act went beyond the simple identification of 
any and all market restraints. Given that the Court limited its condemnation to only those market 
restraints that were unreasonable, the rule and method the Court used to analyze market restraints 
and apply the Sherman Antitrust Act became the Rule of Reason.
53
 However, the Court did not 
utilize the Rule of Reason as the objective, analytical tool it is today until the Court’s Chicago 
Board of Trade opinion in 1918.
54
 
B. Development of the Rule of Reason as Alternative to Per Se Illegality 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chicago Board of Trade marked the beginning of an 
important shift in how the Court applied the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Rule of Reason was 
formally adopted by the Court during its analysis of this case.
55
 The Court’s adoption of the Rule 
of Reason caused a divergence in its methods of analyses. While the Court continued to apply a 
standard of per se illegality to certain types of market restraints, such as maximum and minimum 
resale price fixing, it began to apply its newly developed Rule of Reason test to all market 
restraints not covered by specifically enumerated per se illegality rules. 
 Over the course of the 20
th
 century, the Supreme Court applied its Rule of Reason test to 
an ever increasing number and variety of cases. As the Court’s application of the Rule of Reason 
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to market restraints expanded, its application of per se illegality to market restraints contracted 
proportionally. Over the following years, the Court’s application of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
inexorably moved towards a broader application of the Rule of Reason to a greater variety of 
market restraints. 
 The more inherently harmful the Supreme Court found a certain kind of market restraint, 
the longer it took for the Court to acknowledge that said market restraint could possibly be 
reasonable and therefore eligible for analysis under the Rule of Reason. For example, the Court 
found price fixing of any type particularly harmful.
56
 The Court continued to consider all types 
of vertical price fixing per se illegal for over 100 years after it first started applying the Sherman 




C. Proliferation of the Rule of Reason in the Analysis of Market Restraints 
 “Vertical maximum price fixing like the majority of commercial arrangements subject to 
the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the Rule of Reason.”58 State Oil v. Khan was the 
Supreme Court’s first application of its Rule of Reason to any type of vertical price fixing. The 
type of price fixing in this case was maximum vertical price fixing. The Supreme Court’s 
decades-long reluctance to apply the Rule of Reason to vertical price fixing was demonstration 
of the serious and anti-competitive nature of vertical price fixing. And even though the Court 
decided in 1997 that maximum vertical price fixing was not always inherently anticompetitive 
and unreasonable, the Court’s view of minimum resale price fixing had not changed up to that 
point. 
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 The Department of Justice accused Apple of instituting an unreasonable restraint on trade 
in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. One of the foremost issues in the case was minimum 
resale price fixing.
59
 Throughout the history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court treated few 
market restraints as harshly as it did minimum resale price fixing. For 117 years, the Court ruled 
that all types of minimum resale price fixing were per se illegal. This changed in 2007.
60
 Leegin 
was a landmark case decided by the Court in 2007. Far from legalizing this particular type of 
vertical price fixing, the Supreme Court’s ruling merely allowed for the possibility that this price 
fixing was not always, in every single instance, per se illegal.
61
 
 It was no coincidence that Apple enacted its price fixing scheme so soon after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin. If it had launched its Agency Model just a few short years 
earlier, the Court would have found this Agency Model to be per se illegal. Apple saw a shift in 
the law, and it took advantage of this new ambiguity in antitrust law. Apple’s plan worked 
economically, because at the very least, its new Agency Model had to be analyzed by the Rule of 
Reason in court.
62 
IV. The Sherman Antitrust Act & Apple’s Agency Model. 
A. Overview of Apple’s Agency Model.  
Apple and its publisher co-conspirators created the Agency Model to use as an economic 
and contractual tool. Apple and its publishing partners used the Agency Model to raise the retail 
price of e-books across the entire market.
63
 Apple could not afford to match the e-book pricing of 
its competitors while maintaining a competitive profit margin.
64
 Because of their established 
market share, Amazon’s “Kindle” and Barnes & Noble’s “Nook” were able to offer steadily 
diminishing e-book prices paralleling the increasing volume of their e-book sales. Instead of 
pricing competitively, Apple utilized the publishers’ fear that lowering e-book prices would 
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cause the public to devalue physical, paper books. Apple also had a bargaining advantage, 
because they were such a large distributor of audiobooks. Further, Apple’s contract with its 




 One of the most pernicious aspects of Apple’s Agency Model deal was the amount of 
collusion between the major publishers and Apple.
66
 There were numerous secret meetings 
between the publishers and Apple, and there were a plethora of incriminating e-mails sent 
between the colluding parties. The publishers were already desperately searching for a way to 
stall the growth of the e-book, so they could prolong the life of the paper book. Further, the 
publishers were already looking for a way to injure Apple’s largest competitor in the e-reader 
and e-book market.
67
 The major publishers were frightened of Amazon’s new efficient e-book 
publishing service for unsigned and independent writers. Given the low overhead on e-books, 
Amazon was able to offer relatively high royalty rates to a vast ocean of unknown writers. Some 
new writers were even able to utilize the e-book publishing on Amazon to make six figure 
royalties within the span of a few weeks.
68
  The publishers were afraid their antiquated and 
inefficient publishing policies utilizing popular writers to subsidize unpopular and unknown 
writers would not be able to survive this new medium. 
Apple also leveraged the addition of a clause in the agreement preventing contracted 
publishers from allowing other e-book retailers, with whom they were contracted, to sell the 
contracted publishers’ e-books for a lesser resale price than Apple either could or would sell.69 
As a result, the five major publishers made this agency agreement a mandatory part of all 
contracts with other e-book retailers to whom they were contracted. With all of these new 
contracts, Apple became competitive in the e-book market by causing e-book resale prices 
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throughout the market to initially inflate and subsequently stagnate.
70
 Further, and even more 
suspiciously, Apple’s agency deal with the publishers contained a Most Favored Nation 
(“MFN”) clause that essentially violated the entire idea of the agency deal.71 It stopped the 
publishers from setting prices outside of a very small range of $12.99 to $14.99 and $15.99. 
Even within these ranges, Apple was often able to set the prices.
72
 And once Apple set the prices, 
the publishers could then no longer allow Apple’s competitors to sell for less than Apple. “The 
MFN protected Apple from retail price competition as it punished a Publisher if it failed to 
impose agency terms on other e-tailers.”73 All of these different facets of the agency model 
agreement established between Apple and its e-book suppliers showed that the agreement existed 
more to hurt Amazon and other competitors than to help the publishers. 
B. Vertical Price-Fixing Liability Applied to Apple’s Agency Model.  
Firstly, the Supreme Court’s Rule of Reason test analyzed “specific information about the 
relevant business” and the “restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” 74 The industry involved in 
this case was e-book wholesale (licensing) sales and retail (sublicensing) sales. Within this 
industry, e-book retailers licensed e-books from major publishers, often for around $11.99 for 
new releases. After they licensed the e-books, the retailers were allowed to sell (sublicense) the 
e-books for whatever price they chose. 
75
 
Amazon often sold its new release e-books for $9.99, which was a loss. It sold them at a 
loss, because it wished to build brand loyalty among the consumers of its e-books.
76
 Until 2007 
and Leegin, setting a minimum resale (sublicense) price as a wholesaler, was per se illegal.
77
 
 Next, the Court analyzed the “restraint’s history, nature, and effect” within the e-book 
market.
78
 Apple’s iBook store was not launched until 2010, and this Agency Model restraint on 
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trade did not exist until those major publishers and Apple negotiated the contract relevant to the 
iBook store. This part of the analysis went poorly for Apple and the big five. The e-book market 
existed for nearly a decade before the agency model was first introduced, and the market was 
healthy and growing.
79
 The e-book retailers were making a sizable and growing profit, and the 
publishers’ profit margin on the e-books was equivalent to their corporeal book profit. The 
Agency Model’s restrictive effect on resale pricing options caused a rise in the price of e-books 
and, it prohibited e-book retailers from being able to establish resale prices of their own. The 
effect was a quick and artificial inflation of e-book retail prices.
80
 The publishers wished this 
inflation to boost their profit margin per unit.
81
 However, the unforeseen effect was to lower the 
gross profits made by both themselves and their authors.
82
 The consumers were unhappy with the 
raised prices, so they chose to buy fewer e-books. 
Whether the “businesses involved have market power is a further, significant 
consideration”83 the Court considered in its analysis. The publishers involved in this case were 
five of the six largest book publishers in the world, and Apple was “one of America’s most 
admired, dynamic and successful technology companies.”84 Further, while Apple did not have a 
very large market share in e-book sales at the time of the establishment of the Agency Model 
contract, Apple was technically a very large seller of e-book readers with its iPhone and iPod 
lines.
85
 The fact that these major corporations colluded to inflate retail prices by forcing 
minimum resale prices on every other market participant was damning.
86
 The sheer, economic 
power of the colluding parties in this case may even have been in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, which states: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
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States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, 
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, 
or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
87
 
 Also relevant to the Court’s application of the Rule of Reason was “an inquiry into 
market power and market structure designed to assess [a restraint's] actual effect.”88 The Court 
analyzed the market structure prior to the restraint and Apple’s entrance into the e-book market. 
From the introduction of the e-book until 2010, the market consisted of e-book 
licensors/wholesalers selling e-books to the sub-licensors/retailers for whatever price the market 
would bear. After that, the sub-licensors/retailers would sell the e-books to consumers for 
whatever price best fit their business strategies.
89
 The retailers could raise the price, they could 
lower the price, and they had full control of the product’s resale/sub-license price after they 
bought/licensed it. “This wholesale model was more profitable for a Publisher’s e-book business 
than the agency model proposed by Apple.”90 
 After Apple’s Agency Model contract with the five major publishers in 2010, the whole 
structure of the e-book market changed. Six of the most powerful entities within the e-book 
market forced the Agency Model on all of the e-book sellers under threat of a complete cessation 
of business.
91
 This forceful manipulation reeked of impropriety. Apple and its co-conspirators 
seemed to fail this aspect of the Rule of Reason test. 
 A last and overarching catchall within the Rule of Reason, as outlined in Leegin, was 
whether the effect of the restraint at issue was anticompetitive and harmful to the consumer, or 
whether the restraint stimulated competition and was beneficial to the consumer.
92
 Did the 
restraint help or harm the average consumer? Before the Agency Model was implemented, many 
e-book companies such as Barnes and Noble sold e-books for the same price they paid for said e-
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book. Amazon even sold most bestsellers for a loss. Amazon’s aim was to lure consumers into 
buying other e-books while on its site. Basically, the overall effect of the Agency Model on the 
consumer was an increase in retail e-book prices across the board.
93
 To protect Apple’s profit 
margin, the contracting publishers forced all other e-book retailers to sell for up to 50% higher 
prices. This market restraint would definitely fail the Rule of Reason test. The consuming public 
lost in this scenario. The Sherman Antitrust Act was created to help the public and market 
competition. This restraint harmed them. 
 In summation, all of the factors the Supreme Court enumerated in its opinions when 
analyzing the Rule of Reason added up to whether or not the specific restraint violated three 
different aspects of the subject market and its participants.
94
 The first was whether the parties 
colluded and intended to harm the market participants. Apple and the publishers colluded with 
the intent to harm Amazon in particular as well as other lesser participants in the market. The 
second is whether their restraint on free trade harmed the industry or market.
95
 This restraint 
caused a diminution to all of the publishers’ sales and profits.96 And it also resulted in lowered 
sales and profits for the e-book retailers. Lastly, this Agency Model resulted in artificially 
inflated prices for the consumer.
97
 The only participant in the market that was not harmed by this 
restraint was Apple. Despite minimum price fixing no longer being per se illegal, this Agency 
Model still failed the Rule of Reason test. 
C. Horizontal Price-Fixing Liability Applied to Apple’s Agency Model. 
 The Supreme Court still applies the per se illegality standard to the horizontal price fixing 
restraint. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, it was a more heinous offense, because it involved 
collusion between similarly situated parties that should have competed with one another within a 
certain market.
98
 Horizontal price fixing involves an agreement between horizontally situated 
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parties, those who should be competitors, in an attempt to defraud the consuming public. The 
Court has continued to apply the per se illegality standard to horizontal price fixing, because 
horizontal price fixing is a market restraint that cannot possibly have procompetitive effects.
99
 
And even if Apple and its publishing partners did not violate the Rule of Reason with their 
vertical price fixing, they still colluded in an effort to establish a horizontal price fixing 
conspiracy between the contracting publishers and Apple.
100
 
 Apple’s Agency Model, as described above, included more than just an agreement not to 
sell e-books under a certain price. Apple’s Agency Model agreement with its publishing partners 
also included clauses that prohibited the publishers from allowing any of Apple’s competitors to 
sell for a lower price than Apple.
101
 This was the most basic definition of horizontal price 
fixing.
102
 Apple conspired and colluded with the participating publishers to stop any e-book 
seller from pricing below a certain point. And even if Apple passed all of the Rule of Reason’s 
requirements, as enumerated by the Court, they could not deny the horizontal price-fixing nature 
of Apple’s conspiratorial plotting with the publishers that resulted in the Agency Model 
contracts. The success of the conspiracy depended on Apple’s participation.103 
 Apple and its publishing partners admitted that there was no universal economic 
incentive to fix prices on e-books across all competitive e-book retailers. The publishers were 
chasing the unlikely goal of bolstering the abstract value of a corporeal book.
104
 Apple 
manipulated the publishers’ fears that print publishing would eventually evolve into an industry 
that primarily sold e-books. Apple utilized these fears to build an Agency Model contract with 
the publishers, with a necessary reciprocity that ultimately forced a unilateral and uniform 
pricing scheme across the entire e-book industry.
105
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 Apple’s Agency Model arrangement with its publishing partners started as mere vertical 
minimum resale price fixing, subject to the Rule of Reason. But Apple leveraged its market 
power and the publishers’ fears of its competitors to create a horizontal price fixing stratagem 
that was per se illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
106
 Even if Apple managed to have its 
vertical market restraint proved reasonable, it would still fail. There has never been a legally 
reasonable horizontal price fixing restraint, as a result, Apple’s horizontal conspiracy constituted 
“a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”107 The Department of Justice would eventually 
find Apple in violation of multiple aspects of Sherman Antitrust Act. 
V. The Department of Justice v. Apple Judgment on the Agency 
Model & Conspiracy 
A. Overview of the Case 
On July 10, 2013 the court in Department of Justice v. Apple held that Apple’s Agency 
Model agreement with the defendant publishers violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.
108
 At the 
time of the court’s decision, Apple was the only defendant that remained in the case. The 
publishers that contracted with Apple settled out of court.
109
 The court held that Apple engaged 
in both horizontal and vertical price-fixing conspiracies.
110
 In its opinion, the court first 
addressed the issue of whether Apple engaged in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy. 
 Creating a restraint on trade by horizontal price-fixing was per se unlawful; 
therefore the court’s analysis was not especially involved. However, the court used some creative 
logic to find Apple part of a horizontal conspiracy.
111
 It was creative, because Apple was not 
horizontally aligned with the other conspirators. The Court ruled that Apple was the 
conspiratorial hub connecting the horizontally aligned publishers. After its first analysis, the 
court found that Apple engaged in vertical price fixing as well. Even under the application of this 
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B. Horizontal Price-Fixing 
 The standard of liability for horizontal price-fixing is per se. As such, the court in U.S. v. 
Apple determined only whether Apple engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade. However, the 
court also had to determine whether the conspiracy took place amongst interests situated 
horizontally similarly.
113
 This was an odd course for the court to take, because Apple was a great 
deal more vertically related to the book publishers with which it conspired. 
 While the publishers could have been said to be in a horizontal conspiracy as horizontal 
competitors, it was not clear how the court could show that Apple had participated in such a 
conspiracy. However, the court judged that Apple was an integral and necessary part of the 
conspiracy to price fix amongst the publishers. Apple was the catalyst in this conspiracy, and the 
court decided the conspiracy would not have existed without Apple.
114
 “Understanding that no 
one Publisher could risk acting alone in an attempt to take pricing power away from Amazon, 
Apple created a mechanism and environment that enabled them to act together in a matter of 
weeks to eliminate all retail price competition for their e-books.”115 Apple organized, with the 
publishers, what the publishers had been unable to organize with one another. 
 “To establish a conspiracy…proof of joint or concerted action is required.”116 To 
elaborate, “circumstances must reveal a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, 
or a meeting of minds in an unlawful agreement.”117 Apple argued that there was no meeting of 
minds. It argued that all of the conspirators reached similar but independent conclusions. Apple’s 
defense was that there could be no “conspiracy by telepathy.”118 The court did not accept or 
AWR  Travis Jordan 
Page 19 of 30 
 
validate Apple’s claim of independent creation. The court already knew that “every Publisher 
with whom Apple met lamented Amazon’s pricing New Releases and NYT Bestsellers at $9.99. 
Several of them made clear that they were actively searching for a way to gain more control over 
pricing and were implementing tactics they did not enjoy.”119 
 The evidence showed that there had been cooperation, unity of purpose, and 
correspondence in furtherance of Apple’s conspiracy. Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO at the time, was 
the source of a great deal of this evidence. Jobs told James Murdoch that he understood the 
Publishers’ concerns that “Amazon’s $9.99 price for new releases is eroding the value perception 
of their products . . . and they do not want this practice to continue.”120 He offered to help raise 
the prices, and he even told one reporter “that Amazon’s $9.99 price for the same book would be 
irrelevant because soon all prices will ‘be the same.’”121 The court found this last statement 
especially damning. 
 Further, “calls among the Publisher Defendants’ CEOs would continue and intensify at 
critical moments during the course of the Publishers’ ensuing negotiations with Apple.”122 Many 
times, Apple would reassure each publisher “that it was not interested in entering the e-book 
market by pursuing a low-price strategy. Apple opined that $9.99 was not yet “engrained” in the 
consumer mind, and suggested in each meeting that e-books should be priced between $11.99 
and $14.99.”123 Apple and the publishers conspired with one another to inflate the prices of e-
books many times over the course of contract negotiations. 
 The court determined that there was a unity of purpose and a meeting of the minds. The 
months before the iPad launched, Apple and the publishers communicated constantly with one 
another.
124
 The goal of the conspirators was to raise the retail prices of e-books. Further, every 
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party involved wanted Amazon to lose its e-book market share. The publishers and Apple all 
desired the same objective and the publishers were even willing to forego additional profits, at 
least in the short term, to obtain this objective.
125
 
 Though Apple was not horizontally positioned near the publishers, the court found it had 
committed horizontal price fixing.
126
 Apple’s position within the conspiracy was the most 
important aspect of this analysis. Apple negotiated, initiated, and united the conspiracy. It was 
the conspiracy’s impetus, and the conspiracy could not have existed had Apple not actively 
sought and united the other conspiratorial parties for this purpose.
127
 The publishers had been 




C. Vertical Price-Fixing 
Next, the court looked at whether Apple had been engaged in a vertical minimum resale 
price-fixing conspiracy. This analysis was not necessary, but given vertical price-fixing’s more 
lenient standard of analysis, the court wished to show that Apple would still be in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act under the Rule of Reason.
129
 Unlike horizontal price-fixing, vertical 
price-fixing is analyzed under the Rule of Reason.  
For Apple to have violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the restraint of trade caused by its 
conspiracy had to have been unreasonable and not cancelled out by procompetitive effects. The 
restraint must be actual and adverse as well, because “the plaintiffs bear an initial burden to 
demonstrate the defendants’ challenged behavior had an actual adverse effect on competition as 
a whole in the relevant market.”130 
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 Apple argued that its conspiracy with the publisher was procompetitive, because it 
lowered Amazon’s market share in the e-book market.131 But the court was not addressing such 
competitiveness. The court reminded Apple that the Sherman Antitrust Act is about “the 
protection of competition, not competitors.”132 The court ruled that Apple had one main goal in 
fixing the price. It opined that Apple simply “did not want to compete with Amazon (or any 
other e-book retailer) on price.”133 
 The court went on to point out that there were few clauses more anticompetitive than the 
Most Favored Nation clause Apple inserted into its contract with each publisher. The primary 
effect of the MFN “protected Apple by guaranteeing it could match the lowest retail price listed 
on any competitor’s e-bookstore.”134 However, the MFN clause went far beyond that. The court 
further condemned the MFN, because it “imposed a severe financial penalty upon the Publisher 
Defendants if they did not force Amazon and other retailers similarly to change their business 
models and cede control over e-book pricing to the Publishers.”135 
 Apple tried to argue that a MFN clause was something common that it often included in 
contracts. The court pointed out that the MFN clause used here was unique. “Apple had used an 
MFN in one of its music agreements, but the music had been purchased under a wholesale 
model. Apple’s use of an MFN for a retail price was a unique feature of its e-book agency 
agreements.”136 This MFN clause was simply too powerful and overreaching. 
 The Agency Model theoretically gave pricing discretion to the publishers; however, the 
MFN clause simply took this discretion for Apple. Publishers could set prices in Apple’s e-book 
store. However, Apple could simply change the prices back “unless the Publishers moved all of 
their e-tailers to an agency model and raised e-book prices in all of those e-bookstores, Apple 
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would be selling its e-books at its competitors’ lower prices.”137 The agency agreement was 
supposed to inflate the values of books, but it actually just “eliminated any risk that Apple would 
ever have to compete on price when selling e-books, while as a practical matter forcing the 
Publishers to adopt the Agency Model across the board.”138 
 The court ruled that Apple failed even the much more lenient Rule of Reason analysis.
139
 
There was simply too much evidence of a conspiracy. There were e-mails, phone calls, and trips. 
Cue, an Apple executive, even testified that  “his last trip was unprecedented in length -- it lasted 
nine days -- and as Cue described, for that entire period, if he was not eating or sleeping, he was 
negotiating.”140 There was much more than incidental contact between parties, and the court 
judged that the parties definitely did not independently arrive at the same prices.
141 
VI. The Effect of Leegin on Minimum Resale Price Fixing in Other 
Markets 
A. Overview 
 Apple was not the first company to use the agency model in an attempt to get around the 
price fixing laws established by the Sherman Antitrust Act. With Leegin in 2007, the Supreme 
Court abolished the per se illegality of minimum retail price fixing established in Dr. Miles a 
century before.
142
 It was no coincidence that the major issue in U.S. v. Apple first appeared in 
2011, only a few years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin. With the establishment of 
the Rule of Reason as the new standard of analysis in minimum price fixing cases, many 
corporations tried to take advantage of price fixing. Wholesalers tried to unilaterally force their 
wills on retailers and on consumers. 
 Offending corporations were then able to spend years in court defending their business 
models while violating aspects of the Sherman Antitrust Act. There was no reason not to 
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implement minimum resale price fixing. Even markets such as big box retail and online music 
were incorporating minimum resale price fixing. Under this new, more lenient standard of 
analysis, wholesale corporations began to fix resale prices more often. 
It became poor business not to push against this area of the law. The new, fashionable 
argument became that agency models made the market more “efficient.” The establishment of an 
efficient market was the main reason that the Court instituted the Rule of Reason and its vaguer 
standard to replace per se illegality.
143
 
B. Omega v. Costco: Big Box Price Fixing.  
In Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., Omega manufactured a copyrighted watch 
that it never marketed in America.
144
 It had an agency agreement similar to Apple’s with certain 
retailers in Europe. Costco bought many of these watches from a third party for the purpose of 
resale.
145
 Costco sold these watches in its store for $1200, while Omega’s agency agreement with 
its contracted retailers in Europe required a $2000 resale price.
146
 
 Costco entered into no such contractual agreement with Omega. Costco bought its 
Omega watches on the grey market and brought them to America.
147
 This case started out as an 
issue of agency agreement versus the first sale doctrine in a way similar to the Apple case, but it 
morphed into something very different. Omega asserted copyright and trademark reasoning to 
get around the first sale doctrine.
148
 Omega did not use an agency agreement. They utilized 
copyright and trademark reasoning to get around the Sherman Antitrust Act. Omega won
149
 at 
the Appeals level. As a result, manufacturers and wholesalers acted more and more boldly in 
their attempts to evade certain aspects of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Costco applied to the 
Supreme Court for certiorari. 
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 Corporations who wished to utilize maximum and minimum vertical price fixing saw a 
way to utilize intellectual property concepts to muddle and confuse the antitrust issues. In the 
Omega case, it was ultimately trademark law that benefited Omega.
150
 In a Post-Leegin world, 
corporations became more and more creative in their attempts to skirt laws against market 
restraints such as the Sherman Antitrust Act. This was most apparent in the electronics market as 
corporations attempted to argue that software and electronic media were exempt from vertical 
restraint laws. This was a major issue in the cases involving online music. 
C. Starr v. Sony: Price Fixing in Online Music  
Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment is an ongoing case about alleged collusion 
amongst various music publishers to fix internet music prices.
151
 The plaintiffs were consumers 
of online music, and they claimed that these publishers violated the Sherman Antitrust Act in 
conspiring to fix the prices of online music.
152
 The plaintiffs cited how the price of online music 
had stayed the same throughout the history of the market’s existence despite the fact that 
production costs had gone down.
153
 The plaintiffs used ongoing investigations of the music 
companies for conspiracy and collusion by the New York Attorney General and the Department 
of Justice to show the presence of a conspiracy’s symptoms and the need for discovery to find 
evidence of the conspiracy.
154
 
 The plaintiffs in this case utilized the uncanny lockstep pricing in the online music 
industry to show that there was evidence of anti-competitive practices occurring.
155
 The 
appearance of a complete lack of competition in the online music industry, amongst all of the 
major publishers, showed at least one element of a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. The effects of a possible conspiracy were apparent but the origin was hidden. 
Apple would have argued that there can be no “conspiracy by telepathy.”156  The plaintiffs in this 
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case scored a big win for consumers against price fixing when they proved their right to enter 
discovery and continue the case.
157
 
 The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of licensing and whether it fits within the 
umbrella of vertical price fixing before. The Court’s opinion in United States v. Paramount held 
licensed films to the same Sherman Antitrust standards as more corporeal forms of property.
158
 
The issue of whether the First Sale Doctrine applied to online music and e-books was not as new 
an issue as it at first seemed. Online music price collusion was especially similar to the 
Paramount decision.
159
 Both involved allegations of vertical and horizontal price fixing. Unlike 
with minimum resale price fixing, the Rule of Reason was never adopted by the Court for 
horizontal price fixing. 
VII. Conclusion  
In conclusion, Apple and its five major publishing cohorts violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act with their Agency Model method of restricting free trade for e-book 
retailers. Apple tried to disguise the agreement’s nature by alleging that it was the “agent” for the 
publishing companies. This relationship did not truly exist. The contract existed solely to raise e-
book prices throughout the market to allow Apple to compete in a new market while establishing 
the prices and the profit margins it desired.
160
 Further, Apple conspired with the publishers to 
harm Amazon’s e-book sales with this agency method. However, the parties most harmed by 
Apple’s conspiracy were the authors whose profits saw a large decline and the consumers who 
were forced to pay vastly inflated prices.
161
  
Apple’s Agency Model scheme was definitely in violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Provision, and it may have been in violation of section 2, covering monopolies as well. 
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Lastly, while Apple and five of the Big Six book publishers failed in their attempt to establish 
minimum resale price restraints, more and more companies are succeeding in varied and diverse 
markets where their predecessors failed. 
If the Department of Justice convicted Apple of nothing else, it could still convict Apple 
of horizontal price fixing. It is still per se illegal, and Apple was an integral component in the 
collusion to horizontally fix all e-book prices in the market.
162
 Apple tried to force a new 
industry standard into its publishing contract that ultimately required its competitors to utilize 
this same standard. If the Department of Justice had allowed Apple’s agreement with the 
publishers to stand, there would no longer have been any competition within the e-book retail 
market, because all of the major publishers would be forced to sell or license their products for 
the same price to retailers or risk taking huge losses. The retailers would then be forced to sell or 
sub-license their products for fixed prices. The consumers would be left with no options within 
the market. Apple’s conspiracy had to be struck down, or there would be no competition between 
any e-book retailers, and the consumers would suffer the most.
163
 
For all of the conclusions stated above, the court invalidated Apple’s Agency Model 
agreement.
164
 The price-fixing was too obvious, and it was beneficial only to Apple. In some 
cases, the publishers’ profits dropped 50% or more on a given e-book. Further, sales volumes 
also dropped under this new system. The publishers were so obsessed with getting rid of the 
threat they knew, they could not see the larger threat of Apple. As a result, Apple was able to 
extract some extreme concessions that resulted in both vertical and horizontal price-fixing.
165
 
The conspiracy hurt the consumer, promised short term losses for the publishers, and only had an 
ephemeral chance of being beneficial for the publishers in the long term.
166
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